Independent public-opinion data2026 election cycle / Public beta
CAMPAIGN GUIDE · NEW ZEALAND 2026

Compare the parties.

See the proposals, follow the funding and read the evidence.

7 parties67 selected policy summariesChecked

Proposals and forecasts are party claims. Our checks trace the sources and arithmetic; coalition agreements may change delivery.

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Democracy & Te Tiriti

Representation, local government, political integrity and Te Tiriti.

8 summaries · 7 parties

ACT

1 summary

Complete historical claims, then close the Tribunal

Keep eligible historical Treaty claims until completed, end contemporary Tribunal inquiries and close it after that work, alongside stronger statutory property-rights protections.

2026 election policyParty source
Our assessment & details

Our assessment

Analysis
Strengths
  • Linking closure to completed claims rather than an arbitrary date provides an explicit safeguard against cutting historical cases short.Evidence 1Evidence 2
Trade-offs & risks
  • Ending contemporary jurisdiction removes a Treaty-specific avenue for reviewing current Crown conduct. Proposed property protections address only part of that wider remit.Evidence 1Evidence 2
Open questions
  • Explain pending contemporary cases, affordable court access and how declining funding would still complete historical work properly; transition costs are not quantified.Evidence 1Evidence 2

Party proposal

ACT would end the Waitangi Tribunal's contemporary jurisdiction, retain historical claims lodged by 1 September 2008 and disestablish the Tribunal once that work finishes. It also proposes adding property-rights protections to the Bill of Rights Act, with claims against the Crown pursued through ordinary courts.

Who it covers
Historical Treaty claimants, people raising contemporary Crown grievances, property owners and the Tribunal.
Timing
Closure depends on completing eligible historical claims, with no fixed calendar deadline.
Cost & funding stated by the party
The full paper says funding would reduce with the remaining workload, but quantifies neither savings nor transition costs. The consolidated plan has no separate Tribunal line.
Sources reviewed
ACT: Wind up the Waitangi Tribunal Policy page · Publication date not stated
ACT: full historical settlements and Tribunal paper Policy paper · Published
ACT: Fiscal Plan 2026 Policy paper · Publication date not stated

Green Party

1 summary

Voting rights, donation limits and open lobbying

Expand voting rights, cap individual donations at $30,000 per election cycle and require open reporting of professional lobbying, alongside constitutional discussions grounded in Te Tiriti.

2026 election policyParty source
Our assessment & details

Our assessment

Analysis
Strengths
Trade-offs & risks
  • Donation limits restrict private funding; disclosure, levies and reporting create compliance duties, with exemptions for ordinary democratic participation.Evidence 1Evidence 2Evidence 3
Open questions
  • Specify public campaign and constitutional-discussion budgets, lobbyist levy rates and a parliamentary timetable; explain how constitutional proposals would be agreed.Evidence 1Evidence 2

Party proposal

The Greens propose voting from age 16, voting rights for everyone in custody, election-day enrolment, entrenched Māori seats and a constitutional conversation grounded in Te Tiriti. Their September package sets a $30,000 donor cap per party and its candidates per election cycle, individual-only donations, disclosure above $1,000 a year and professional-lobbyist registration with four-monthly reporting and a two-year stand-down for former ministers.

Who it covers
Voters, parties, donors, professional lobbyists and constitutional discussion participants. Ordinary MP contact, submissions, petitions, union bargaining and Treaty settlement negotiations are excluded from the lobbying regime.
Timing
The donation draft would commence after Royal assent and the lobbying draft six months after assent; both require Parliament to enact them. No calendar timetable for the wider voting or constitutional changes is stated.
Cost & funding stated by the party
The manifesto proposes public resourcing for constitutional discussions and campaigns without a total amount. The lobbying draft permits fees and levies on registered lobbyists to fund its commission; no levy rate or programme budget is set.

The bills are consultation drafts, not enacted law. The newer announcement specifies the donor cap that the broader manifesto chapter leaves open.

Sources reviewed
Greens: 2026 manifesto — democracy Manifesto chapter · Publication date not stated
Greens: donation and lobbying reforms Announcement · Published
Greens: Regulation of Lobbying Bill — consultation draft Policy paper · Publication date not stated

Labour

1 summary

An independent Parliamentary Budget Office

Establish an independent Parliamentary Budget Office to scrutinise government finances and parties’ election policy costings.

2026 election policyParty source
Our assessment & details

Our assessment

Analysis
Strengths
  • Consistent independent costings could help voters compare fiscal promises using the same published methods, and the plan includes a defined operating allocation.Evidence 1Evidence 2
Trade-offs & risks
  • The office requires ongoing public funding and access to information; its value depends on operational independence and credible methods.Evidence 1Evidence 2
Open questions
  • Specify appointment safeguards, data-access powers and the publication timetable before the next election.Evidence

Party proposal

Labour proposes a Parliamentary Budget Office to independently examine government finances and cost parties’ election commitments on a consistent basis, giving voters information about fiscal trade-offs.

Who it covers
Voters, Parliament and political parties using or scrutinising independent costings.
Timing
The fiscal plan allocates operating funding from 2028/29. The policy does not specify the exact establishment date or whether every service would start then.
Cost & funding stated by the party
The fiscal table provides $3.5m annually in 2028/29–2030/31: $10.5m total, within Labour’s operating allowances.
Sources reviewed
Labour: fiscal strategy — transparency Policy page · Publication date not stated
Labour: fiscal strategy announcement Announcement · Published

National

1 summary

Council rate limits and an independent regulator

Set a target range for council rates increases, with independent oversight, exemptions and community consultation.

2026 election policyParty source
Our assessment & details

Our assessment

Analysis
Strengths
  • A published range and independent exemption process could make rates decisions more predictable and easier for communities to scrutinise.Evidence
Trade-offs & risks
  • A national range limits councils’ revenue discretion while infrastructure and essential services still need funding; exemptions become important.Evidence
Open questions
  • How would exemption tests, regulator funding and council transition work, and how would the range reflect different local pressures?Evidence

Party proposal

National would require councils to keep annual rates increases within a 2–4% target range, overseen by an independent regulator. Exemptions would cover exceptional needs or demonstrated prudent financial management, with community consultation required.

Who it covers
Councils and ratepayers; the proposed range includes a minimum increase as well as an upper limit.
Timing
Implementation in 2029, with council transition support.
Cost & funding stated by the party
The reviewed page does not separately cost the regulator or transition support.
Sources reviewed
National: Keeping rates affordable Policy page · Publication date not stated

NZ First

1 summary

Replace the Waitangi Tribunal

Replace the Waitangi Tribunal with a commission for older claims and move contemporary work to the Ministry of Māori Development.

2026 election policyParty source
Our assessment & details

Our assessment

Analysis
Strengths
  • Sets out which bodies would handle historic and contemporary claims, plus a deadline for introducing legislation.Evidence
Trade-offs & risks
  • Contemporary claims would move from the Tribunal to a Crown ministry, changing how claims against government policy are scrutinised.Evidence
Open questions
  • How would independent review, claimant access and existing settlement obligations be protected, and what would the transition cost?Evidence

Party proposal

NZ First proposes abolishing the Waitangi Tribunal and replacing it with a commission to complete claims from before 2008. It would move contemporary claims and Crown–Māori relations work to the Ministry of Māori Development.

Who it covers
Treaty claimants and the institutions handling Treaty claims, settlements and Crown–Māori relations.
Timing
Legislation tabled within the first 100 days after the election. Tabling legislation is not the same as it becoming law.
Cost & funding stated by the party
No total cost or funding source specified in the reviewed source.
Sources reviewed
NZ First: Waitangi Tribunal replacement proposal Policy page · Publication date not stated

Opportunity (TOP)

2 summaries

Lobbying transparency and political integrity

Register lobbyists, cap donations and establish an anti-corruption body.

2026 election policyParty source
Our assessment & details

Our assessment

Analysis
Strengths
  • A searchable register and donation disclosure could make political influence easier to trace, with ordinary contact with MPs explicitly excluded.Evidence
Trade-offs & risks
  • Donation restrictions narrow parties’ funding options; a new anti-corruption body adds public costs and must work alongside existing watchdogs.Evidence
Open questions
  • What is the launch timetable and funding path, including the costing unit active in election years and the new body’s independence safeguards?Evidence

Party proposal

Opportunity proposes a public lobbying register, a one-year cooling-off period between ministerial and lobbying roles, a $30,000 donation cap per party and donor per election cycle, and an independent anti-corruption body.

Who it covers
Professional lobbyists, ministers and senior officials, political parties and donors. The policy would restrict donations to enrolled voters and exclude ordinary contact with an MP from lobbying rules.
Timing
No implementation date specified in the reviewed source.
Cost & funding stated by the party
The party estimates around $52 million annually: $40 million for an anti-corruption body, $10 million for the Electoral Commission and $2 million for policy costing in election years. It says register costs could be met from existing justice budgets.
Sources reviewed
Opportunity: Clean Up Politics Policy page · Publication date not stated

Treaty commitments, public deliberation and Māori development

Honour Treaty commitments, review recent law changes, support a constitutional conversation and give capable Māori providers more authority.

2026 election policyParty source
Our assessment & details

Our assessment

Analysis
Strengths
  • Pairs Treaty commitments with practical finance and service-delivery proposals, while specifying transparency, financial integrity and individual-rights protections for devolved providers.Evidence 1Evidence 2
Trade-offs & risks
  • Changing marine-title and statutory settings changes existing legal arrangements. Devolution transfers responsibilities and requires capacity, mandates and accountability to be established.Evidence
Open questions
  • Which statutes and services would change first, who designs the constitutional process, and what funding and evaluation would accompany the transfer of authority?Evidence 1Evidence 2

Party proposal

Opportunity would honour settlements, restore customary marine-title settings from before the 2025 changes, and review statutory Treaty provisions law by law. It would support a national constitutional discussion with Māori participating as a Treaty partner, improve finance options for Māori projects and devolve services where results would improve.

Who it covers
Māori communities and asset owners, Crown agencies and people participating in constitutional discussions. Devolved providers would have operational autonomy alongside financial, rights and outcome accountability.
Timing
September 2026 paper; no implementation dates for the legislative review, constitutional process or devolution programme are stated.
Cost & funding stated by the party
Longer-term funding for proven providers and improved project financing are proposed. The paper does not give a total cost or new annual allocations.
Sources reviewed
Opportunity: Honouring Te Tiriti Policy page · Publication date not stated
Opportunity: full September 2026 Te Tiriti paper Policy paper · Publication date not stated

Te Pāti Māori

1 summary

Binding Treaty remedies and executive accountability

Make Treaty remedies binding, allow independent scrutiny of executive decisions, and fund Māori-led constitutional discussion.

2026 election policyParty source
Our assessment & details

Our assessment

Analysis
Strengths
  • Specifies remedies, independent oversight, a four-year fund and judicial recourse, giving clearer accountability mechanisms than a general promise to honour Te Tiriti.Evidence 1Evidence 2
Trade-offs & risks
  • Binding remedies and executive suspension powers alter Crown decision-making. Appointment independence, statutory tests and timely court review would matter for implementation.Evidence
Open questions
  • What would the Commission cost, how would appointments and serious-breach tests work, and what schedule and funding would deliver the wider legislative programme?Evidence

Party proposal

Te Pāti Māori would make Waitangi Tribunal recommendations binding and create an independent Te Tiriti Commission able to suspend seriously non-compliant executive decisions, subject to High Court override. It proposes a Mātike Mai Fund and development of a domestic UN Indigenous-rights action plan.

Who it covers
The Crown and Māori communities. The Commission could scrutinise bills and report to Parliament, but would not invalidate Acts of Parliament.
Timing
Restore and resource UNDRIP action-plan development within the first 100 days; constitutional transformation target of 2040. No complete legislative delivery schedule is supplied.
Cost & funding stated by the party
$220m for the Mātike Mai Fund over four years. The paper does not separately state the Commission’s cost or a complete funding reconciliation.
Sources reviewed
Te Pāti Māori: Te Tiriti entrenchment announcement Announcement · Published
Te Pāti Māori: full 2026 Te Tiriti Entrenchment paper Policy paper · Publication date not stated

Selected coverage, not a ranking of policy quality. How we review the sources

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